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Abstract. This paper uses Japanese prefecture-level data for the years 1979 and 1996 to 
examine how the relationship between government size and life satisfaction changes. 
The major findings are: (1) Government size has a detrimental effect on life satisfaction 
when government size impedes economic growth in the economic development stage. 
However, this effect clearly decreases when government size is not associated with 
economic growth in the developed stage. (2) Particularized trust is positively associated 
with life satisfaction of females but not with that of males. Such a tendency becomes 
more remarkable in the developed stage.  These results are unchanged when the 
endogeneity bias caused by local government size and proxies of trust are controlled for.   
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1. Introduction 
 
How and why do people become happy? This has been undoubtedly been among the 
most important questions for policy makers (Layard, 2006). Since the early 1990s, 
researchers in the fields of economics and political economics have begun to pay 
attention to it (Frey & Stutzer, 2002).  Increasing numbers of works attempting to 
analyze individual subjective well-being have considered not only economic factors such 
as income level and consumption but also various other ones such as formal and 
informal institutions 1 . It is widely acknowledged that the government plays an 
important role in society. Therefore, in respect to public choice, exploring government 
size is now thought to be a major issue and empirical works have investigated its impact 
on subjective-well being2. Bjørnskov et al. (2007) presents evidence that government 
size decreases life satisfaction, which is in line with the view of public choice theory that 
government size becomes larger than the optimal one to benefit country‟s citizens 
because governments actually do not act as „benevolent dictators‟. However, this finding 
is deduced from limited cross country data, and the dynamic aspect has not been taken 
into account. It is worthwhile examining whether the negative association between 
government size and well-being is stable over time because dynamic factors influence on 
life satisfaction (Bjørnskov et al., 2008d).  
The conjecture that resources are allocated less efficiently by larger governments, 
leading to lower economic growth is supported by several report (e.g., Landau, 1985; 
                                                   
1 For instance, informal institutions such as social trust or social capital (e.g., Bjørnskov, 
2003; Helliwell, 2006) and formal institution (Frey & Stutzer, 2000; Bjørnskov et al., 
2008c) are regarded as critical in determining subjective well-being. 
2 Bureaucratic rent and decentralization are considered to be determinants of life 
satisfaction (Luechinger et al., 2006; Bjørnskov et al., 2008 b) 
Peden & Bradley, 1989; Dar & AmirKhalkhalim 2002; Fölster & Herekson, 2002). On 
the other hand, some researchers find no discernable relationship between government 
size and economic growth (e.g., Ram, 1986; Bairam, 1990; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; 
Mendoza et al., 1997)3. Guseh (1997) pays attention to the institutional features of 
countries and points out that government size has a detrimental effect on economic 
growth in developing countries, but that this negative effect is clearly mitigated by 
democracy4. As shown by Acemoglu et al. (2008), per capita income is positively related 
to the rise of democracy. This leads me to presume that a matured democracy viewed as 
an outcome of the rise in per capita income decreases government inefficiency, leading 
to an alleviation of the negative influence of government size on life satisfaction5. 
However, no work has attempted to examine whether the effect of government size on 
life satisfaction changes under a dynamic process of institutional change. 
As well as government size, it is argued that various factors such as social trust, 
human capital, and age can be considered as determinants of life satisfaction 
(Bjørnskov et al., 2007; Bjørnskov et al., 2008 c; Scoppa & Ponzo 2008). The 
determinants of life satisfaction appear to vary between different periods of time, even 
in the same country.  This might be in part because formal and informal institutional 
changes appear to influence life styles and interpersonal relationships.  
Japan has experienced rapid economic growth, especially in the postwar period 
(Yamamura et al., 2005; Yamamura & Shin, 2007). Such growth inevitably transformed 
traditional Japanese society into a modern one; this is reflected, for instance, in the rise 
                                                   
3 There is argument that the relationship between government size and growth is 
non-linear (Barro 1997; Grossman, 1988; Chen & Lee, 2005). 
4 The degree of democracy is thought to play a crucial role in improving economic 
efficiency (Feld & Savioz, 1997). 
5 It is not observed that the degree of democracy alleviates the detrimental influence 
caused by government size in cross country analysis (Bjørnskov et al., 2007).  
in the social standing of women. It seems that in the wake of changes in circumstance, 
the generational and gender gaps in the way life is perceived have widened6. Thus 
Japan is a country suitable for comparing different circumstances across generations 
and genders. Survey data on Japan, from 1979 and 1996 cover life satisfaction across 3 
age groups and both genders.  This data allows me to compare the determinants of life 
satisfaction between different points in time and across generations and genders. The 
present paper uses this data to assess the effects of government size and other 
socio-economic factors on life satisfaction. It also looks at how these effects vary under 
the influence of societal structural changes.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Features of Japanese society 
and changes in life satisfaction are briefly reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 explains the 
data and methods used.  Section 4 discusses the results of the estimations. The final 
section offers concluding observations. 
 
2. Review of modern Japanese society and life satisfaction 
 
As is more fully explained in section 3, the rate of people who feel satisfied with life is 
used as a measure of life satisfaction index. Data is available separately for males and 
females across 3 generations at the prefecture level. Change in life satisfaction is 
exhibited in Table 1 (a); it shows that life satisfaction significantly increases from 1979 
to 1996, and that the degree of increase for females is consistently higher than that for 
males. Government size is measured by the total share of government expenditure in 
                                                   
6 Empirical research concerning trust in Japan presents evidence that there is a 
distinct difference in the degree of trust between genders (Yamamura, 2008a), and 
across generations (Yamamura, 2008 b). 
prefectural income and is presented in table 1 (b).7 From this data it can be seen that 
government size increased slightly, despite the difference between 1979 and 1996 being 
statistically insignificant. This shows that the rise in life satisfaction seems to be 
associated with an increase in government size, which does not correspond to the 
conjecture derived from public choice theory. The level of real per capita income in 1996 
is higher than that in 1979, whereas the 5 years growth rate during 1996-2001 is nearly 
0, distinctly lower than that for 1979-19848. This implies that the end of the 1970s can 
be characterized as a low income and growth stage, while the mid-1990s is a high 
income and steady growth period9. In this paper, 1979 and 1996 are defined as the 
developing and the developed stage. 
Although there appears to be a positive relationship between income level and life 
satisfaction in Table 1, most existing reports provide no evidence that income level is 
                                                   
7 Prefectural GDP cannot be obtained in 1979 and so prefectural income is used instead. 
There are various measures of government size such as the government share of 
consumption in GDP (Bjørnskov et al., 2007), total tax share in GDP (Fölster & 
Herekson, 2001), total government share in GDP (Grossman, 1988; Fölster & Herekson, 
2001). Chen and Lee (2005) used three measures; share of total government 
expenditure in GDP, government investment expenditure in GDP and government 
consumption expenditure in GDP. It should be noted that the way of measuring 
government size is thought to influence estimation results when the relationship 
between government size and economic growth is examined (Landau, 1985). 
Nevertheless, in this paper, the main focus falls on an assessment of the effect of 
government size on life satisfaction, which is not explained by rigorous growth theory. 
Hence, in this paper, I use total expenditure comprised of various types of expenditure 
at a prefectural level.   
8 This paper looks at the efficiency of government in 1979 and 1996, since people's 
aspirations appear to change over time (Easterlin, 1995); therefore, the efficiency at a 
different point in time has less impact on life satisfaction than the present efficiency. 
Previous works have focused on the growth rate between past and current years and 
assessed its influence on life satisfaction (DiTella et al., 2003). The growth rate between 
past and current years reflects past efficiency, rather than current efficiency since 
economic growth can be considered as an outcome of efficient resource allocation. For 
this reason, I look at economic growth between current and subsequent years. 
9 It should be noted that Japan experienced miraculous economic growth during the 
1950s and 1960s (Hayami, 2001). Therefore, the high growth period in Japan is 
generally considered to be the two decades prior to 1970s.  
positively associated with life satisfaction (Frey & Stutzer, 2002). If an increase in 
income leads to a rise in individual‟s income aspirations (Stutzer, 2004), there might be 
another channel through which income influences life satisfaction. Thus channel, if it 
exists, has not been taken into account in the existing literature. I aim to shed light on 
an indirect effect of income increase on life satisfaction, rather than a direct one. It 
seems plausible that democracy tends to be a mature one when income levels reach 
those of developed countries (Acemoglu et al., 2008). If this holds true, it would be 
worthwhile considering how a matured democracy resulting from an income increase is 
related to life satisfaction. For instance, a possible channel can be considered as follows, 
“stricter democratic control might restrain bureaucrats‟ deleterious impact, lead to 
efficiency gains, and increase people‟s happiness” (Bjørnskov et al., 2007, pp.270-271).   
A cursory examination of figure 1 reveals a negative relationship between 
government size and life satisfaction, in both 1979 and 1996, which is in line with public 
choice theory. From figure 2 (a), government size is negatively related with economic 
growth. For a closer examination, I compare its relationship in 1979 and in 1996. Figure 
2 (b) demonstrates a negative relationship in 1979 whereas Figure 2 (c) exhibits a 
slightly positive one in 1996. This leads me to argue that government size impeded 
economic efficiency in 1979 but did not in 1996. In my conjecture, one reason why the 
detrimental effect of government size on efficiency disappears might be that democracy 
becomes matured as a result of an increase in income. These considerations lead me to 
advance the Hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: Government size is negatively related with life satisfaction in the 
developing stage when government size causes inefficiency. Subsequently, negative 
relationships between government size and life satisfaction disappear in the 
developed stage when government size does not cause inefficiency.   
I now look more closely at life satisfaction in Japan. Life satisfaction is categorized 
into genders and generations in 1979 and 1996, as set out in Table 2. From Table 2, I 
found it interesting that the degree of life satisfaction for the 16-40 year old generation 
is lower than for other generations for both genders in 1979, whereas that of the 16-40 
year old generation become higher than the others in 1996. World War II finished 51 
years before 1996; thus the 16-40 generation in 1996 can be considered as the only 
generation of people born in the post-World War II period among those generations in 
Table2. This generation was educated in a democratic environment and grew up 
alongside the growth of the Japanese economy10. The circumstances in which Japanese 
people lived changed; partly under the guidance of international society, and partly due 
to strong citizen empowerment during the postwar period. For instance, Japan ratified 
the United Nation‟s “Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women” in 197911. What is more, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law for 
Men and Women was promulgated in 1985. It was partially amended in 1997 and came 
into force on 199912. Women thus gained in social standing and had a larger influence on 
the social lives of Japanese in the 1990s than in the 1970s. The postwar generation‟s 
way of thinking and life style has been influenced by their education and are thus 
congruent to the matured democracy circumstances of Japan in the 1990s. This might 
be one of reasons why the postwar generation tends to be more satisfied with life than 
other generations in the developed stage. 
                                                   
10 Pre-war Japanese education emphasized an emperor-centered historiography based 
on state Shintoism, which portrayed Japan as a divine country under the unbroken rule 
of the imperial family. Prewar education was diametrically opposite to that under the 
democracy introduced in the post war period.  
11 See http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/. 
12 http://www.cc.matsuyama-u.ac.jp/~tamura/kintouhou.htm (in Japanese). 
 3. Data and method 
 
3.1. Data  
    Table 3 includes the definitions of variables and the means for data analyzed from 
1979 and 1996. The life satisfaction and trust data used here are from surveys were 
carried by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nihon Hoso Kyokai) in 1979 and 1996, 
Japan Broadcasting Corporation (1979, 1996). Respondents were asked, “Do you feel 
satisfaction with your life?”. There were four choices; “yes”, “More yes than no”, “no”, 
“No response”.  Male and female respondents were recorded separately, at the 
prefecture level.  Therefore, using this data I can calculate the rate of respondents who 
responded positively as “yes” and “I would rather say yes”.  I use this rate as the 
measure of satisfaction. There were two questions related to trust; (1) “Are there many 
persons whom you can trust among your neighbors?”, (2) “Are there many persons 
whom you can trust among your relatives?”. The rates of respondents who said “yes” to 
each question are used as the measure of trust.  As discussed later, two kinds of proxies 
for trust are used to assess the different features of trust on life satisfaction.  
 Per capita real incomes and population are derived from Index Publishing (2006). 
The Gini coefficients of income in 1979 and 1994 are from the Statistics Bureau of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications13.  The human capital index is taken 
from the Hi-Stat data base14.  Other variables are from Asahi Shimbun (2004).   
                                                   
13 Gini data at the prefecture level are obtained every five years; as 1996 data is not 
available, I used 1994 data. 
14 Data is available at 
http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/~fukao/japanese/data/fuken2000/pfactor.xls. This 
prefecture-level panel data base was constructed by Fukao and Yue (2000).  
 3.2.  Methods 
 
  In line with the discussion above, the estimated function of trust takes the following 
form: 
Ln(SATISFY) itsu= 0 + 1 Ln(GOVSCAL) it + 2Ln(NETRUST)itsu + 
3Ln(RETRUST)itsu + 4Ln(INCOM)it +5Ln(POP)it + 6Ln(GINI)it + 
7Ln(HC)it +8Age1640s+9Age4160s +9Femaleu+10Year_1979t  
+εitsu,  
 
where SATISFY represents the rate of trust in prefecture i, for year t, generation s and 
gender u.  ‟s represents the regression parameters. εitsu represents the error term.   
The structure of the data covers two years, 1979 and 1996, and is for 47 prefectures. 
Generation dummies are included to capture the generation effects. Y1640 and Y4160 
stand for the 16-40 and 41-60 generations, respectively. The default generation is the 
generation over 60 years old. Female and Year_1979 are dummy variables aiming to 
control for gender and year effects, respectively. The dependent variable and all 
independent variables, with the exception of dummy variables, take log forms. 
Therefore, their coefficient, , means the elasticity, which allows me to directly compare 
the degree of impact of each variable.  
It is necessary to deal with the endogenous problem. Satisfied people appear to be 
lenient in their evaluation of government performance, resulting in excessive 
government expenditure. That is to say, life satisfaction seemingly influences the 
government size; thus Bjørnskov et al. (2007) attempt to control for endogeneity of 
government size. Furthermore, satisfied people are also likely to trust others, resulting 
in an endogenous bias. Inevitably, it is necessary to control for endogenous bias not only 
from government size but also from trust. GMM estimation allows me to generalize the 
covariance structure of ε and therefore the estimation result is valid even if ε is 
heteroscedastic (Greene 1997, pp. 742-744).  To alleviate these potential endogenous 
problems and heteroscedasticity, GMM 2SLS estimation was employed.  
  The effects of each variable on life satisfaction are discussed later in this section. The 
hypothesis raised in the previous section leads me to expect the coefficient sign of 
GOVSCAL to be negative, while its absolute value for 1996 becomes smaller than that 
of 1979.  
Trust is considered to carry the advantage that transaction costs are reduced in a 
long-term transaction network based on trust; something that can be seen in the 
subcontract system in the Japanese manufacturing industry (Asanuma, 1989). I thus 
generally predict the signs of trust to be positive, as in some studies (Bjørnskov , 2003; 
Helliwell, 2003, 2006; Bjørnskov et al., 2007). More precisely, interpersonal trust can be 
roughly divided into generalized and particularized trust (Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov 
2006). “The central idea distinguishing generalized from particularized trust is how 
inclusive your moral community is.” (Uslaner, 2002: 26-27).  People with generalized 
trust have positive views toward both their own in-group and out-groups, whereas those 
with particularized trust have positive views of their own in-group but a negative 
attitude toward groups to which they do not belong. Trust in relatives can convincingly 
be taken as particularized trust because a blood relationship is relatively stable and 
closed to others15. As pointed out by Uslaner (2002), neighborhood trust shares the 
                                                   
15 Although other people can become relatives through marriage, this effect seems to be 
characteristics not only of particularized trust but also of generalized trust. A lack of the 
population mobility induces neighbors to repeatedly interact with each other so that 
interpersonal trust is formed among them through long term relationships. This can be 
regarded as particularized trust. On the other hand, assuming that there is much 
mobility in the population of a community, strangers are more apt to become neighbors. 
In such a situation, trust formed among neighbors can be taken as generalized trust. 
These difference in characteristics between RETRUST and NETRUST might lead to 
different outcomes. 
Economic factors are captured by incorporating INCOM, POP and GINI as 
independent variables. Above all, INCOM is included to empirically test the 
presumption derived from the traditional economic theory that individuals gain 
satisfaction from income. It is known that people encounter difficulties in making a 
success of collective action, although it plays a critical role in increasing benefits for 
society (Olson, 1965). A previous case study of Japan found that income inequality 
hampers collective action (Yamamura, 2008c). As well, income inequality is considered 
to harm health status (Kawachi et al., 1997). I thus predict that the sign of GINI 
becomes negative.  
It is acknowledged that human capital increases income (Becker, 1964). If this holds 
true, human capital will improve life satisfaction. As suggested above, however, income 
level is already controlled for. Accordingly, I should interpret HC to capture the impact 
of human capital on life satisfaction through other channels. For instance, under the 
same constraint, more educated individuals seem to consume goods more efficiently 
because they can more easily access useful information. This is why the anticipated sign 
                                                                                                                                                     
relatively small. 
of HC is positive.   
 
4. Results 
Table 4 shows the results of the OLS estimations.   Tables 5 and 6 report the 
results of the GMM 2SLS estimations. In Table 5, to instrument for RETRUST and 
NETRUST, I employ the following variables; logarithms for changing residence within 
prefecture, immigrants from other prefectures, and for the number of fire fighting 
teams, as well as 4 region dummies16. As discussed earlier, social trust seems to collapse 
through population mobility captured by changing residence and as an immigrant 
(Yamamura 2008a). A local voluntary organization such as a fire fighting team 
generalizes trust among its members through interpersonal communication in 
cooperative activities (Yamamura, 2008b). These variables are relevant determinants of 
the degree of trust and are not directly associated with life satisfaction. In Table 6, not 
only RETRUST and NETRUST but also government size is considered as an 
endogenous variable. Hence, added to the instrument variables as above, I use a 
logarithm for the number of natural disasters because government spending increases 
to recover from it.  
In each table, the results for all samples are shown in Columns (1)- (3). The 
results of subsamples consisting of 1979 and 1996 years are in columns (4)-(6) and 
(7)-(9), respectively. Furthermore, both male and female samples are used in columns 
                                                   
16 Kanto region dummy, Chubu region dummy, Kinki region dummy, and Urban areas 
dummy.  The Kanto region is comprised of 7 prefectures; Ibaragi, Tochigi, Gunma, 
Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, and Kanagawa. The Chubu region is comprised of 9 prefectures; 
Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, Yamanashi, Nagano, Gifu, Shizuoka, and Aichi. The 
Kinki region is comprised of 7 prefectures; Mie, Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara, and 
Wakayama. Urban areas consist of 5 prefectures; Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, and 
Hyogo. 
(1), (4), and (7) in each of the Tables. Male samples are in columns (2), (5), and (8) in 
each of the Tables. Female samples are in columns (3), (6), and (9). 
 
4.1.   OLS model. 
 
I begin by looking at the key variable, GOVESCAL. As shown in columns(1)-(3), 
the results estimated using 1979 and 1996 year samples show significant negative signs 
and the absolute value for males is 0.08, which is two times larger than that for females. 
If samples are restricted to the 1979 year, they continue to indicate significant positive 
signs and their absolute values become larger, between 0.09 - 0.20. On the other hand, 
the results obtained for the 1996 year samples show that they are not statistically 
significant and its absolute values are between 0.002 - 0.02 and therefore show 
considerable decline although their signs are negative. These results are consistent with 
the Hypothesis presented in the Section 2.  
 
As for trust, signs of NETRUST are not stable and are statistically 
insignificant, which does not correspond to the anticipation. This might be partly 
because that the results of NETRUST suffer from endogeneity bias.  On the other 
hand, as expected, coefficient signs of RETRUST are mostly significant positive signs, 
with the exception of columns (5) and (8). Compared with NETRUST, RETRUST is 
more likely to be determined exogenously because a kinship relation was formed in the 
distant past. As a result of this, the results of RETRUST are less inclined to be biased. 
In 1979, the magnitude of the female coefficient is 0.24, which is approximately 5 times 
larger than that of the male one. A similar result is obtained in 1996.  
Consistent with previous research (Frey & Stutzer, 2002), signs of INCOM are 
not stable and therefore the level of income does not play a critical role in improving life 
satisfaction. By contrast, in all estimations, I found GINI to take the expected negative 
sign although not statistically significant in 1996, which is congruent to the 
anticipation and to the assertion that life satisfaction is influenced by the income of 
surrounding people (Scoppa and Ponzo, 2008). Negative signs of HC in 1979 are not 
consistent with the prediction, whereas positive signs in 1996 are in line with it. In my 
interpretation, educated individuals are more inclined to have many opportunities to 
work when the market mechanism functions more effectively.  That is, a university 
education confers considerable advantages for job seeking. Abundant opportunity to 
work leads not only to an increase in income but also to a reduction of the likelihood of 
unemployment. Therefore, the expected sign of HC is positive and its absolute value is 
larger in 1996 than in 1979 because the life time employment system has been 
undergoing gradual collapse and a more market orientated mechanism appeared to be 
working its way into the Japanese labor market. 
It is interesting to observe that the coefficients of Age_1640 and Age_4160  exhibit 
negative signs with the exception of Age_1640 in 1996. This implies that, compared 
with the over 61 years old generation, younger generations such as Age_1640 and 
Age_4160 are less likely to feel satisfied with life, with the exception of Age_1640 in 
1996. The estimation results correspond to Table 2. The education obtained by the 
generation born post-World War II is considered to be aligned with democracy, much 
different from the education received by the previous generation. The circumstances of 
modern Japan re more influenced by democracy than before the end of World War II. It 
seems thus an appropriate argument that the relationship between postwar period 
education and modern Japanese life is complementary. As a consequence, the life 
satisfaction rate of the postwar educated generation was higher than that of the older 
generation in the developed stage. Hence, I find the extent to which human capital 
matches up to formal political institutions to be important17. Significant positive signs 
of Female in all estimations correspond to the results of DiTella et al. (2003).   
 
4.2.   2SLS model.  
 
Before turning to consider the coefficients of each variable in Tables 5 and 6, I first 
check the validity of the instrumental variable method.  An over-identification test is 
used to test the hypothesis that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated to the error 
term18.  As in the third row from the bottom, the results fail to reject the hypothesis 
and so all estimations pass the over-identification test.  Overall, the choice of 
instruments is valid in all estimations and so the GMM 2SLS estimation is applicable.  
As shown in Tables 5 and 6, the results of GOVSCAL are unchanged from Table 4 as 
discussed above after controlling for endogenous bias; this strongly supports the 
Hypothesis concerning he effect of government size. With respect to trust, NETRUST 
shows consistently positive signs in all estimations, and is statistically significant in 
1996.   
As for RETRUST, I found it surprising that in the 1996 male coefficient takes a negative 
                                                   
17 Transition economies are expected to confront the same difficulties since there seems 
to be differences in education in considering the market economy between communist 
and post communist periods. It is worthwhile examining the matching problem between 
the communism generation and the modern market oriented society.  
18 In a GMM context, when there are more moment conditions than parameters to be 
estimated, a chi-square test can be used to test the overidentifying restrictions. The test 
statistic is called the Hansen's J statistic. Therefore, I report J statistics instead of 
Sargan's. 
sign whereas the female one takes a significant positive sign. Any difference from Table 
4 might be because of an alleviation of endogenous bias by the GMM 2SLS method. I 
interpret the results of RETRUST as follows; compared with males, Japanese females 
are less inclined to take full-time jobs and so they don‟t set up inter-personal networks 
in the work place. Furthermore, market information is incomplete especially in the 
labor market, whereas long-term repeated personal interactions within a relative 
network increase the information shared between network members. Females tend to 
allocate time to interact with relatives because a woman‟s time allocated to work could 
be shorter than a man‟s. This circumstance induces females to rely on informal relative 
networks rather than market ones. For instance, matching between a child and a 
strange babysitter is very difficult, leading to a rise in the transaction cost. In Japan, 
when a mother raising a child cannot care for her child, she is inclined to rely on 
relatives via a non-market network rather than demand a babysitter through the 
market. In the developed stage where the market has matured, interpersonal 
relationships become relatively scarce. Accordingly, an interpersonal network becomes 
more valuable, causing trust between people to make a greater contribution to female 
life satisfaction than before.  
As for generation dummies, Tables 5 and 6 continue to demonstrate significant 
positive signs of Age_1640 in 1996, although other results show mixed signs. This leads 
me to argue that postwar education is robustly complementary to the circumstances of 
the 1990s.  
We have presented various estimated results.  Taking the results together, we 
concluded that those in this section were consistent with and supportive of the 
hypothesis and argument concerning other socio-economic determinants put forward in 
the preceding section.  
 
5. Conclusion 
That government size has a detrimental effect on the degree of life satisfaction from 
the view point of public choice theory is a plausible conclusion. However, a country 
transits from the developing stage to the developed one in tandem with increases in 
income accompanied by institutional change. There appears to be a positive relationship 
between income and democracy; thus economic growth is thought to influence life 
satisfaction through a rise in democracy. Another issue then arises, that of whether the 
negative influence of government size on life satisfaction continues to be stable over 
time in the process of economic and institutional development. Little is known about 
this issue. Therefore, this paper used Japanese prefecture-level data for the years 1979 
and 1996 to investigate how government size is associated with life satisfaction. The 
situations for each year can be roughly characterized as follows. Favorable economic 
growth was achieved although per capita income level was not so high in 1979, whereas 
per capital income reached a high level despite the low economic growth rate in 1996. 
Thus 1979 and 1996 are defined as the developing and the developed stage, respectively. 
Through a GMM 2SLS estimation, which allows me to control for endogeneity bias, 
I found as follows: (1) Government size has a detrimental effect on life satisfaction when 
it impeded economic growth in 1979. By contrast, a negative impact of government size 
effect on life satisfaction disappeared in 1996 when government size was not associated 
with economic growth. (2) Particularized trust is positively associated with female life 
satisfaction but not with male. Such a tendency becomes more remarkable in the 
developed stage.  These results do not change in the developed stage when I control for 
the endogeneity bias caused by local government size and proxies of trust. (3). The 
degree of life satisfaction of the generation born in the post-World War II period is 
remarkably higher than other generations, for both males and females.  
The findings above clarify that government size is not associated with life 
satisfaction if it does not impede economic growth, consistent with the findings of 
Bjørnskov et al. (2007) that government effectiveness alleviates the negative effects of 
government size. Nonetheless, achieving a mature democracy seems to take a long time. 
I conjecture that in the mid-1990s, Japan reached a level of income and economic 
development in which democracy substantially functioned, and so was in a matured 
state.  Consequently, as pointed out by Guesh (1997), stronger democracy subdues the 
negative effect of government size on economic growth.  That is, it can be argued that 
the relationship between government size and life satisfaction evolves under the 
influence of changes in circumstances.  
It is difficult to find proxy variables to appropriately capture the changes of 
circumstance such as democracy and other formal institution influences. Limitations 
inherent in the data, deduced from aggregated prefecture-level data, do not allow me to 
more closely and directly explore the effect of changes of circumstance. For instance, 
individual characteristics such as the degree of trust, employment and birth year are 
required to scrutinize the assertion as above (e.g., DiTella et al., 2003; Helliwell, 2003; 
Bjørnskov et al., 2008a; 2008b). Hence, further research will be necessary to more 
carefully investigate this.  
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(c) 1996 
Fig.1 Government expenditure and life satisfaction. 
Note.  Government size is a log of government expenditure over total income, and life 
satisfaction is a log of the rate of respondents who feel satisfaction with their life. 
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(c) 1996 
Fig.2 Government expenditure and growth rate of real per capita income. 
 
Note. Government size is ln(Government expenditure/ Income). The growth rates 
during 1979-1984 and 1996-2001 are presented in the 1979 and 1996 columns, 
respectively. 
 
 Table 1.  Comparison between 1979 and 1996 (%) 
(a) Life satisfaction 
  1979 1996 t-value 
All sample  73.6 
 
82.9 12.7** 
Male 
 
68.9 81.4 11.4** 
Female 
 
78.3 84.5 7.9** 
 
(b) Government expenditure rate, Regional real per capita income, and 
Growth rate of real per capita income. 
  1979 1996 t-value 
Government 
expenditure (%) 
   15.7 17.0 1.06 
Real per capita Income 
(Thousands yens) 
2,092 3,009 10.7** 
Growth rate (%) 15.1 -0.1 17.2** 
 
Note. Absolute t-values are presented. ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  The growth rates during 1979-1984 and 1996-2001 are presented in the 
1979 and 1996 columns, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Life satisfaction by generation in 1979 and 1996 (%) 
(1)  
     Male       Female 
Generation 1979 1996  1979 1996 
16-40   63.1 
 
 90.5   74.5   88.5 
41-60 
 
 63.5  72.8   75.0   78.7 
60_ 
 
79.9 80.8  85.5  86.4 
 
Note. Generation categories are different between 1979 and 1996. Categories for 1979 
are 16-40 years old, 41-60 years old and over 61 years old. Categories for 1996 are 16-30 
years old, 31-55 years old and over 56 years old. These categories are equivalent to 
those of 1979. For comparison between 1979 and 1996, I roughly group them as follows: 
16-30 years old, 31-55 years old, and over 56 years old generations in 1996 correspond to 
16-40 years old, 41-60 years old, and over 60 years old generations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Variable definitions and basic statistics 
 
Variables Definition  Mean Standard 
deviation 
GOVSCAL Government expenditure/ Income 
(%) 
  16.3 5.61 
NETRUST 
 
Rates of respondent trusting 
neighbors (%) 
 47.4 10.1 
RETRUST Rates of respondent trusting 
relatives (%) 
 68.2   6.8 
INCOM 
 
Regional real per capita income 
(thousands of Yen). 
 2,550 616 
POP 
 
Number of population (thousands). 2,516 2,292 
GINI 
 
Gini coefficient of income 0.27 0.02 
HC 
 
Human capital index 1.04 0.03 
Age_1640 
    
Generation between 16 and 40 
years old dummy 
0.33 0.47 
Age_4160 
   
Generation between 41 and 60 
years old dummy 
0.33  0.47 
Female  
    
Female dummy 0.50 0.50 
Year_1979 
 
1979 year dummy 0.50 0.50 
Note. Values are simple averages. Data source is the Japan Broadcasting Corporation 
(1979; 1996), Asahi Shimbun (2004), Index Publishing (2006) and the Statistics Bureau 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (various years).  The 
definitions of generation dummy variables correspond to those in Table 2. 
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Table 4.  Dependent variable: rates of respondents satisfied with life. (OLS model) 
 (1)1979  
& 1996 
(2)1979 
& 1996 
MALE 
(3) 1979  
& 1996 
FEMALE 
(4)1979 
 
 
(5)1979 
MALE 
(6)1979 
FEMALE 
(7)1996 (8)1996 
MALE 
(9)1996 
FEMALE 
Ln(GOVSCAL) -0.06** 
(-3.02) 
-0.08** 
(-2.55) 
-0.04* 
(-1.93) 
-0.14** 
(-4.68) 
-0.20** 
(-4.69) 
-0.09** 
(-2.39) 
-0.01 
(-0.72) 
-0.02 
(-1.09) 
-0.002 
(-0.12) 
Ln(NETRUST) 
 
-0.01 
(-0.57) 
-0.005 
(-0.13) 
-0.009 
(-0.32) 
-0.01 
(-0.51) 
0.02 
(0.59) 
-0.06* 
(-1.94) 
0.008 
(0.31) 
0.03 
(0.92) 
0.02 
(0.60) 
Ln(RETRUST) 0.32** 
(8.47) 
0.35** 
(5.85) 
0.27** 
(7.32) 
0.14** 
(2.55) 
0.05 
(0.64) 
0.24** 
(3.66) 
0.10** 
(2.79) 
0.03 
(0.66) 
0.16** 
(4.16) 
Ln(INCOM) 
 
0.02 
(0.49) 
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
0.04 
(1.05) 
0.002 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(-0.95) 
0.04 
(0.71) 
0.08* 
(2.01) 
0.07 
(1.34) 
0.08* 
(1.94) 
Ln(POP) 
 
-0.01* 
(-2.15) 
-0.01 
(-1.33) 
-0.01* 
(-2.02) 
-0.03** 
(-3.43) 
-0.04** 
(-2.72) 
-0.02* 
(-2.19) 
-0.009 
(-1.20) 
-0.01 
(-0.82) 
-0.008 
(-1.03) 
Ln(GINI) 
 
-0.22** 
(-3.38) 
-0.24** 
(-2.41) 
-0.19** 
(-2.76) 
-0.36** 
(-3.85) 
-0.39** 
(-3.24) 
-0.34** 
(-2.64) 
-0.04 
(-0.61) 
-0.03 
(-0.38) 
-0.04 
(-0.51) 
Ln(HC) 
 
0.02 
(0.14) 
-0.03 
(-0.10) 
0.11 
(0.56) 
-0.44* 
(-1.93) 
-0.61* 
(-1.99) 
-0.33 
(-1.13) 
0.15 
(0.85) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.29 
(1.48) 
Age_1640 
    
-0.04** 
(-3.74) 
-0.05** 
(-2.54) 
-0.04** 
(-3.08) 
-0.17** 
(-11.3) 
-0.21** 
(-10.2) 
-0.13** 
(-6.50) 
0.06** 
(6.28) 
0.12** 
(7.33) 
0.03** 
(2.75) 
Age_4160 
   
-0.01** 
(-12.4) 
-0.15** 
(-9.64) 
-0.09** 
(-8.67) 
-0.17** 
(-14.7) 
-0.22** 
(-12.6) 
-0.13** 
(-9.51) 
-0.08** 
(-7.81) 
-0.09** 
(-6.13) 
-0.06** 
(-5.15) 
Female  
    
0.08** 
(11.8) 
  0.13** 
(14.7) 
  0.04** 
(6.13) 
  
Year_1979 
 
-0.15** 
(-6.93) 
-0.21** 
(-6.31) 
-0.09** 
(-3.77) 
      
Constant 
   
-0.49 
(-1.55) 
-0.31 
(-0.64) 
-0.60* 
(-1.72) 
-0.70* 
(-1.82) 
-0.32 
(-0.66) 
-0.84 
(-1.59) 
-0.81** 
(-3.07) 
-0.76* 
(-2.24) 
-0.78** 
(-2.65) 
Obs 564 282 282 282 141 141 282 141 141 
Adj. R 2 0.59 0.60 0.54 0.70 0.70 0.55 0.64 0.73 0.60 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. Year dummies are included, but not reported in order to save space. 
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Table 5   Dependent variable: rates of respondents satisfied with life (GMM 2SLS model) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  Both NETRUST and RETRUST are treated as endogenous variables and thus instrumented. Six instruments are the 
Logarithm for the number of fire fighting teams, logarithm for changing residence within prefecture, logarithm fir immigrants from 
other prefectures, Kanto region dummy, Chubu region dummy, Kinki region dummy, and Urban areas dummy. The Kanto region is 
comprised of 7 prefectures; Ibaragi, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, and Kanagawa. The Chubu region is comprised of 9 
prefectures; Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, Yamanashi, Nagano, Gifu, Shizuoka, and Aichi. The Kinki region is comprised of 7 
prefectures; Mie, Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara, and Wakayama. Urban areas consist of 5 prefectures; Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, 
Osaka, and Hyogo. O-I test presents the Hansen‟s over-identification test. 
 (1)1979  
& 1996 
(2)1979 
& 1996 
MALE 
(3) 1979  
& 1996 
FEMALE 
(4)1979 
 
 
(5)1979 
MALE 
(6)1979 
FEMALE 
(7)1996 (8)1996 
MALE 
(9)1996 
FEMALE 
Ln(GOVSCAL) -0.09** 
(-2.54) 
-0.15* 
(-2.23) 
-0.04 
(-1.63) 
-0.22** 
(-3.69) 
-0.30** 
(-3.41) 
-0.12** 
(-2.37) 
-0.005 
(-0.19) 
-0.03 
(-0.94) 
0.005 
(0.22) 
Ln(NETRUST) 
 
0.68* 
(2.04) 
0.76 
(1.62) 
0.27 
(1.38) 
0.53 
(1.39) 
0.59 
(1.34) 
0.29 
(0.90) 
0.42* 
(2.28) 
0.50* 
(2.03) 
0.27* 
(2.18) 
Ln(RETRUST) 0.09 
(0.28) 
-0.46 
(-0.66) 
0.42* 
(1.81) 
0.25 
(0.55) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.40 
(1.04) 
0.35 
(1.50) 
-0.24 
(-0.54) 
0.57** 
(2.71) 
Ln(INCOM) 
 
0.03 
(0.64) 
-0.07 
(-0.65) 
0.07 
(1.52) 
0.03 
(0.51) 
-0.10 
(-1.16) 
0.10 
(1.26) 
0.06 
(1.06) 
0.04 
(0.54) 
0.06 
(0.92) 
Ln(POP) 
 
0.001 
(0.05) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
-0.008 
(-0.80) 
-0.03** 
(-2.33) 
-0.03 
(-1.49) 
-0.03* 
(-1.97) 
0.02 
(1.48) 
0.01 
(0.58) 
0.01 
(1.14) 
Ln(GINI) 
 
-0.17 
(-1.50) 
-0.13 
(-0.74) 
-0.23* 
(-2.27) 
-0.43** 
(-2.60) 
-0.44** 
(-2.64) 
-0.42* 
(-2.10) 
0.08 
(0.74) 
0.07 
(0.49) 
0.02 
(0.27) 
Ln(HC) 
 
1.04* 
(1.82) 
0.77 
(1.20) 
0.62 
(1.51) 
0.39 
(0.67) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.38 
(0.64) 
0.65* 
(1.70) 
0.78 
(1.48) 
0.52* 
(1.74) 
Age_1640 
    
0.18* 
(1.67) 
0.19 
(1.31) 
0.06 
(0.89) 
0.04 
(0.40) 
-0.01 
(-0.13) 
0.03 
(0.28) 
0.19** 
(3.26) 
0.29** 
(3.02) 
0.10** 
(2.77) 
Age_4160 
   
0.02 
(0.36) 
-0.01 
(-0.16) 
-0.01 
(-0.22) 
-0.40 
(-0.46) 
-0.08 
(-0.75) 
-0.05 
(-0.70) 
0.02 
(0.51) 
-0.01 
(-0.30) 
0.04 
(0.92) 
Female  
    
0.05** 
(4.04) 
  0.10** 
(6.52) 
  0.04* 
(1.66) 
  
Year_1979 
 
-0.09** 
(-2.40) 
-0.19** 
(-3.60) 
-0.07* 
(-2.19) 
      
Constant 
   
-0.50 
(-1.04) 
0.21 
(-0.25) 
-0.73* 
(-1.91) 
-0.83 
(-1.52) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-1.17* 
(-1.80) 
-0.51 
(-1.08) 
-0.47 
(-0.91) 
-0.38** 
(-0.81) 
Obs 564 282 282 282 141 141 282 141 141 
O-I test chi2  
p< 
3.17 
0.52 
3.23 
0.52 
4.57 
0.33 
5.57 
0.23 
4.01 
0.53 
5.18 
0.26 
0.20 
0.99 
0.98 
0.91 
1.97 
0.74 
Adj. R 2 0.02 -0.11 0.29 0.26 0.22 0.15 0.20 0.30 0.12 
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Table 6   Dependent variable: rates of respondents satisfied with life (GMM 2SLS model) 
 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by the robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.   GOVSCAL, NETRUST and RETRUST are treated as endogenous variables and thus instrumented. Seven 
instruments are the logarithm for the number of natural disasters, logarithm for the number of fire fighting teams, logarithm for 
changing residence within prefecture, logarithm for immigrants from other prefectures, Kanto region dummy, Chubu region dummy, 
Kinki region dummy, and Urban areas dummy. The Kanto region is comprised of 7 prefectures; Ibaragi, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama, Chiba, 
Tokyo, and Kanagawa. The Chubu region is comprised of 9 prefectures; Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, Yamanashi, Nagano, Gifu, 
Shizuoka, and Aichi. The Kinki region is comprised of 7 prefectures; Mie, Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara, and Wakayama. Urban 
areas consist of 5 prefectures; Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, and Hyogo. O-I test presents the Hansen‟s over-identification test. 
 (1)1979  
& 1996 
(2)1979 
& 1996 
MALE 
(3) 1979  
& 1996 
FEMALE 
(4)1979 
 
 
(5)1979 
MALE 
(6)1979 
FEMALE 
(7)1996 (8)1996 
MALE 
(9)1996 
FEMALE 
Ln(GOVSCAL) -0.15** 
(-2.63) 
-0.23** 
(-2.40) 
-0.08* 
(-1.66) 
-0.40** 
(-4.33) 
-0.49** 
(-3.07) 
-0.30** 
(-3.60) 
0.004 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
0.03 
(1.05) 
Ln(NETRUST) 
 
0.55* 
(1.83) 
0.65* 
(1.70) 
0.19 
(1.02) 
0.29 
(1.15) 
0.57* 
(1.67) 
0.09 
(0.36) 
0.37* 
(2.27) 
0.44* 
(2.08) 
0.22* 
(2.07) 
Ln(RETRUST) 0.35 
(0.98) 
-0.05 
(-0.09) 
0.44* 
(1.96) 
0.47 
(1.17) 
0.17 
(0.33) 
0.40 
(1.09) 
0.33 
(1.13) 
-0.20 
(-0.43) 
0.46* 
(2.23) 
Ln(INCOM) 
 
-0.02 
(-0.40) 
-0.13 
(-1.19) 
0.02 
(0.48) 
-0.12 
(-1.65) 
-0.22* 
(-1.76) 
-0.09 
(-1.08) 
0.07 
(0.99) 
0.06 
(0.72) 
0.10 
(1.42) 
Ln(POP) 
 
-0.01 
(-0.81) 
-0.01 
(-0.56) 
-0.01 
(-1.31) 
-0.08** 
(-3.46) 
-0.08* 
(-2.05) 
-0.07** 
(-2.99) 
0.02 
(1.50) 
0.01 
(0.68) 
0.01* 
(1.66) 
Ln(GINI) 
 
-0.13 
(-1.28) 
-0.08 
(-0.54) 
-0.18* 
(-2.00) 
-0.27* 
(-1.74) 
-0.26 
(-1.29) 
-0.20 
(-1.10) 
0.05 
(0.53) 
0.04 
(0.27) 
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
Ln(HC) 
 
0.71 
(1.29) 
0.52 
(0.83) 
0.38 
(0.89) 
-0.44 
(-1.03) 
-0.53 
(-0.82) 
-0.53 
(-1.19) 
0.63* 
(1.74) 
0.79 
(1.51) 
0.56* 
(2.02) 
Age_1640 
    
0.15 
(1.57) 
0.16 
(1.35) 
0.04 
(0.61) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
-0.007 
(-0.07) 
-0.04 
(-0.58) 
0.17** 
(3.46) 
0.27** 
(3.22) 
0.09** 
(2.86) 
Age_4160 
   
0.01 
(0.20) 
-0.02 
(-0.28) 
-0.02 
(-0.54) 
-0.08 
(-1.52) 
-0.07 
(-0.88) 
-0.09* 
(-1.71) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
-0.02 
(-0.55) 
0.02 
(0.45) 
Female  
    
0.06** 
(4.67) 
  0.11** 
(8.12) 
  0.02* 
(2.03) 
  
Year_1979 
 
-0.14** 
(-3.00) 
-0.23** 
(-4.14) 
-0.09** 
(-2.32) 
      
Constant 
   
0.11 
(0.18) 
0.82 
(0.89) 
-0.33 
(-0.68) 
0.56 
(0.81) 
1.16 
(1.06) 
0.42 
(0.59) 
-0.59 
(-0.96) 
-0.68 
(-1.00) 
-0.80 
(-1.38) 
Obs 564 282 282 282 141 141 282 141 141 
O-I test chi2  
p< 
6.49 
0.26 
3.01 
0.55 
4.83 
0.29 
1.49 
0.82 
1.43 
0.83 
3.83 
0.42 
0.62 
0.96 
1.56 
0.81 
1.18 
0.88 
Adj. R 2 0.17 0.14 0.37 0.43 0.17 0.34 0.30 0.40 0.30 
